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Human Rights Violations by
Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia
by Richard J Wilson * and Emily Singer Hurvitz**
idespread sexual violence is occurring throughout
South-Central Somalia, and the perpetrators of this
violence are often alleged to be government secu-
rity forces and military personnel from the African Union
Mission for Somalia (AMISOM).' Within Somalia, there is
little recourse for victims of sexual violence, and human rights
practitioners are looking to international options as alternative
venues for seeking justice. This article uses the case of peace-
keeping troops in Somalia perpetrating human rights violations
to explore the liability of peacekeepers and their home states
in these situations. It assumes, for
purposes of analysis here, that due
to their traditional immunities, the
international organizations involved in Withn
providing the peacekeeping forces are
not themselves accountable for human 1 1 ( C
rights violations or criminal miscon- SV0
duct, but that issue is not explored
comprehensively in this article. ri s practiti
alternative
After the fall of President Siad
Barre in 1991, Somalia limped for- S
ward, a paradigmatic example of a
failed state with no functioning or
internationally recognized govern-
ment.2 The state fell into two decades of lawlessness and fight-
ing between rival clans.3 Drought and famine affected large
swaths of the population in 1992 and from 2010-2012 while
an Islamist insurgency caused extensive civil strife.4 In 2012,
a new government with international support took power, but
many Somalis remained internally displaced.5 After two decades
of armed conflict and famine, Somalia's nascent political and
judicial institutions remain ineffective.6
Human rights monitors have reported a widespread risk of
rape and sexual violence for displaced Somali women and chil-
dren. The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of
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Humanitarian Affairs reported that sexual violence is a perva-
sive problem throughout Somalia and that oftentimes the attacks
are carried out by armed men in uniform.' The UN reported
that at least 1,700 people were affected by sexual violence in
Somalia in 2012.9
Peacekeeping forces are generally deployed to areas of
conflict, or to post-conflict zones, with the goal of improving
the peacemaking process. 0 When peacekeepers can preserve a
ceasefire between fighting parties, the chances of reaching a suc-
cessful peace agreement may increase,
and post-conflict forces provide stabil-
ity for the development of stable and
iS safe governmental operations." The
T V t SUN is a leader in peacekeeping mis-
sions, with sixteen peacekeeping oper-d h n ations currently deployed on four con-
tinents.12 Despite the sound record of
performance and the good intentions
al 1 al4s of peacekeeping missions, interna-
tional peacekeepers have been associ-
ated with criminal misconduct, includ-
stce ing sexual violence. Crimes against
women and children have followed
UN peacekeeping operations in sev-
eral locations,13 and the UN reported
that the entrance of peacekeeping troops into a conflict situation
has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.14
Peacekeeping operations date back to the 1950s, but reports
of abuse by such forces have occurred only recently; the first
such report of sexual violence emerged in 1999, when Human
Rights Watch reported on sexual exploitation in Guinean refugee
camps.1 5 Since then, a stream of scholarship and UN activities
have criticized and analyzed the issue of peacekeeper account-
ability through the first decade of the 2000s.16 This work culmi-
nated with the recommendations of the UN Special Committee
on Peacekeeping Operations, a companion report from a
group of legal experts, and a Draft Convention on Criminal
Responsibility of Experts on Mission for the UN, all of which
were completed between 2005 and 2006.1 Of greatest relevance
to this writing is the common unchallenged conclusion of these
bodies: under the standard agreement between the UN and the
troop-contributing state, the behavior and punishment of mili-
tary personnel are under the exclusive control of the troop-con-
tributing state." Article 46 of the 1990 Model Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) provides that all UN peacekeeping staff are
1
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immune from legal process in respect to acts that they perform
in their official capacity, while Article 47(b) provides that if the
accused is a member of the military, he or she "shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating
states in respect of any criminal offences which may be commit-
ted by them in [the host country or
territory]." 19 While these rules are
among the most clear, the appli-
cable law governing peacekeeping
operations is a web of complex and
often evolving interactions between
domestic and international norms,
with issues of privileges and immu-
nities, extraterritorial jurisdiction,
and the interaction of interna-
tional human rights law together
with that of humanitarian law and
international or domestic criminal
responsibility.
)esit t
for human rights violations and the prosecution of criminal
conduct. Prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations is
generally easiest in the location where the crime was committed
because the evidence and witnesses are there. But this normal
procedure is often difficult to carry out, for the simple reason
un li
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Peacekeepers operate in a com-
plicated legal framework. Each
state contributes civilian advisors, police forces, and military
officials to serve as peacekeepers within a foreign jurisdic-
tion, all under the operational command of an agreed-upon
outside organization. This complexity can negatively affect both
state responsibility for human rights violations and individual
accountability for crimes committed by peacekeepers. For exam-
ple, UN Member States contribute UN peacekeepers, but the
peacekeepers work under the authority of the UN, not the home
government of the participating troops.20 Under the normal rules
of territorial jurisdiction, the host state would be responsible
e)bee assoc
m1iscondu c
that some states, such as Somalia,
have legal institutions that are too
fragile or unstable to permit local
prosecutions. When the UN begins
a new peacekeeping operation, it
establishes either a SOFA or a sta-
tus of mission agreement (SOMA)
with the host country that governs
the obligations of the peacekeepers
to the host country and the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the
peacekeepers.2 1 These agreements
frequently provide for extensive
immunities for the peacekeepers'
conduct within the host state. 22
Typically, an agreement will indi-
cate that peacekeepers are only subject to criminal jurisdiction in
their own countries, rather than the jurisdiction of the host coun-
try or that of the operational commanders. 23 The agreement may
also include provisions requiring peacekeepers to follow local
laws, but it is unlikely that a host state could enforce its laws on
the peacekeepers because the host state does not have criminal
jurisdiction over them.24 The reality is that states contributing
peacekeeping troops to UN missions rarely prosecute peace-
keepers for crimes they commit in the host country.25 It seems
ironic that those charged with keeping the peace and protecting a
IHH (Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation) relief effort in refugee camps in Somalia, August 2011.
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population of civilians are often involved in victimizing this very
population and increasing strife despite their opposite mission.
to AMISOM in the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, but only time will tell how receptive, or how effective,
the African system will be for bringing justice to Somali victims.
AMOM PA
Following the failed efforts of
ship to establish an African pea
in 2005,26 the UN authorized
Intergovernmental Authority on D
tection and training mission in So
Peace and Security Council estab
2007 - with an initial mandate
support for transitional institu-
tions, facilitate humanitarian
operations, and create a stable
environment for development
in Somalia.2 8 The UN Security
Council officially authorized and
endorsed AMISOM in February
2007,29 and it has continued to
reauthorize the peacekeeping
mission - with the most recent
authorization set to expire in
October 2014. The current reso-
lution approves troop strength in
Somalia exceeding 22,000 uni-
formed personnel.3 0
The Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali
Republic (Somalia) and the
African Union signed a SOMA
in March 2007.31 Paragraph 54
of the agreement specifies, in
Somali and regional leader- VICTIM PROTECTION
cekeeping force for Somalia Another important element to consider in any criminal
the African Union and the prosecution is victim protection. Without mechanisms to ensure
evelopment to deploy "a pro- their safety, it is unlikely that victims will come forward to bring
malia."27 The African Union criminal cases. Many international bodies have taken steps to
lished AMISOM in January ensure victim protection and support. The International Criminal
of six months - to provide Court, for example, provides protection services through the
Rome Statute, the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, and
the Regulations of the Court
The plicab law governig and ofthe Registry. 3 Both the
peace International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
of iVolv (ICTY) and the International
interaction tomestic ad CriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR) have units dedicated to
internatic nal with issue- supporting and protecting vic-
tims and witnessesp.3l The Somali
x tr a niti government has not made pro-
x r ric n,~ an tecting survivors easy; for exam-
ple, in January 2013, the gov-
1I no f V l ternent arrested a woman who
ri .witor alleged that security forces raped
her, along with the journalist who
hum( a - Ii 1n i ntc-- ra a (r reported on the allegations .3 9
Somalia's traditional culture and)omr Ac ir -unl it W )If its history of clan-based gover-
n ance with influences of Shariah
typical language, that all AMISOM personnel are immune from
legal process for any act performed in their official capacity.32
Paragraph 55(b) explains that military members of AMISOM
who commit crimes in Somalia are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their home state. 33 This provision suggests that
Somalia could not effectively prosecute a military member of
AMISOM for crimes that he or she commits within Somalia.
This is the case despite the provision of the agreement requiring
AMISOM personnel to respect Somalia's laws and regulations,
a conflict of laws issue adding to the complexity of many peace-
keeping missions. 34 The agreement does outline some shared
responsibility between the Somali government and AMISOM
for the arrest, interrogation, and detention of AMISOM person-
nel for violations committed within Somalia,35 but the respon-
sibility for prosecuting AMISOM personnel lies with the home
state of the AMISOM member.
S II F EA TIOPS
Human rights groups have alleged that AMISOM troops
and local security forces alike have perpetrated acts of sexual
violence. 36 With the SOMA provisions on immunity and home-
country prosecution of perpetrators, it is unlikely that Somalia
can prosecute any members of AMISOM for their commission
of sexual violence against Somali citizens. Somali victims of
sexual violence have additional claims for international human
rights violations against Somalia or the states contributing troops
law coupled with a relatively weak justice sector, leads to an
environment that is not hospitable to victims of sexual violence.
SFairE REPOSIMUTY FOR PEACEKEEPER ACIONs
The violation of international human rights obligations can
give rise to state responsibility for those violations. As noted
above, the states contributing troops are most likely to have
responsibility for violations committed by peacekeeping troops.
There are two key issues in this analysis: whether the state in
question exercises exclusive or effective control over its troops
in the receiving country, and whether human rights obligations
have extraterritorial application to the sending country. Recent
decisions in both the European Court of Human Rights4 0 and the
Inter-American human rights system41 suggest that human rights
obligations do apply extraterritorially when a state has effective
control over its military operations in a foreign country.
A recent decision by the Dutch Supreme Court held that the
Netherlands was responsible for the deaths of three Bosnian
Muslim men in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.42 While working
for the UN peacekeeping mission, Dutch peacekeepers forced
the Bosnians to leave the safety of the UN compound during the
massacre in Srebrenica, and Bosnian-Serb forces killed them.43
The Dutch Supreme Court found that, under international law,
when a unit from a state is serving under the auspices of an inter-
national organization, its activities are attributable to the sending
state, the international organization, or both.44 In this case, the
4 3
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Court held that though both the UN and the Dutch government
had some control over the troops in question, the Dutch govern-
ment had "effective control" during the period that the acts in
question occurred and was therefore liable for the actions com-
mitted by the peacekeepers.45
This decision is important because it establishes that peace-
keepers do not act in a legal vacuum and that immunity does
not necessarily extend to all UN or peacekeeping activities,
but only to those acts legitimately performed in the mission's
official capacity.46 Though this decision does not constitute
binding precedent outside of the Netherlands, it could be an
indication that other courts may also hold states responsible for
the actions of their peacekeeping delegations stationed abroad.
Other courts may look to the Dutch Supreme Court's decision
because the Court based its holding on two sets of rules created
by the International Law Commission of the UN:4 7 the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts of 200148 and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations of 2011.49 The Dutch Supreme Court
also pointed out that when the Netherlands contributed troops to
the UN, the troops were still in the service of the Netherlands
and the state maintained the power to decide personnel issues
and to punish the troops under disciplinary or criminal law.50
Other courts dealing with similar issues could also utilize this
type of argument to find that a state had effective control over
its troops serving in a peacekeeping mission.
Another recent example of peacekeepers causing harm in a
host state is that of UN peacekeepers in Haiti. In 2004, the UN
Security Council established the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) 1 following an armed conflict that ousted
the country's president.52 After a destructive earthquake in 2010,
the UN Security Council increased the number of MINUSTAH
troops in Haiti.53 The UN sent peacekeeping troops from Nepal
to join the MINUSTAH troops in Haiti.5 4 The UN stationed the
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), to reinforce the military compon
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UN Photo/Isaac Billy
SOMALIA, Buur-Hakba: Photograph taken and released by the
African Union-United Nations Information Support team 27 February
2012. An armored personnel carrier of Ugandan forces serving with
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) advances along
a road toward the central Somali town ofBuur-Hakba. AU-UNIST
PHOTO /STUART PRICE.
Nepalese soldiers close to a tributary of the Artibonite River,
which is one of Haiti's main sources of potable water. The UN
constructed poor sanitation facilities for the Nepalese soldiers
and sewage eventually contaminated the tributary with cholera.
Cholera is a prevalent disease in Nepal and an outbreak occurred
just before the soldiers left to join MINUSTAH.56 The Haitian
Ministry of Public Health reported on the appearance of the
disease just downstream from the MINUSTAH base less than
a month after the troops from Nepal arrived in
Haiti."
The UN denies responsibility for the cholera
epidemic, but a recent report by the Yale Law
School and the Yale School of Public Health
concluded that the UN did cause the cholera
epidemic in Haiti, and that the UN's refusal to
compensate the victims of the epidemic is a
violation of its obligations to the Haitian gov-
ernment under international law." Victims of
the epidemic filed a class action lawsuit against
the UN in U.S. federal court in 2013.59 The
UN stated that it cannot receive the complaint
pursuant to Section 29 of the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.6 0 This
convention is binding on the United States,61
and in addition to the Convention, the U.S.
International Organizations Immunities Act pro-
vides that international organizations "shall
ent of the UN enjoy the same immunity from suit and every
form of judicial process as is enjoyed by for-
eign governments, except to the extent that
5 4
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such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract."62
Based on these international and domestic legal instruments,
the UN's argument of immunity will probably be successful
in the U.S. legal system.63 The case, however, raises important
questions about the extent to which traditional organizational
immunities can be trumped by the more fundamental values
inherent in the international human rights of victims of serious
or ongoing violations.
L
The Dutch Supreme Court case noted above is an important
example of a state being held responsible for the actions of its
troops serving in a UN peacekeeping mission abroad; however,
it is unlikely that many national cases will follow the Dutch
example in the near future. The immunities of international
organizations and state troops are difficult to circumvent, and
many states may not have the necessary legal infrastructure
for extraterritorial application of their criminal laws. The UN's
denial of responsibility for the cholera outbreak in Haiti also
illustrates the strength of immunities granted to international
organizations. The case of sexual violence perpetrated by
AMISOM peacekeeping troops in Somalia faces similar obsta-
cles. It is unlikely that a national case against AMISOM itself
or the troop-contributing states would be successful due to these
immunities. Alternatively, the international arena may provide a
stronger chance for success.
Prosecuting AMISOM personnel for acts of sexual violence
committed against Somali citizens may be more successful in
international or regional courts than in national courts because
these courts set aside the issue of immunity. Sexual violence
perpetrated by AMISOM troops likely constitutes a violation
of international law.' It is widely agreed upon that those who
commit acts that constitute international crimes under interna-
tional law can be held criminally responsible. 65 The immunities
that may complicate the prosecution of these types of cases in
national courts are explicitly disregarded in the international
courts so that state officials can be brought to justice. 66
Despite the fact that the SOMA between the African Union
and Somalia provides that AMISOM personnel are immune
from legal process for acts performed in their official capac-
ity,67 there is a strong argument that sexual violence cannot be
committed within an official capacity. In the case against former
head of state of Chile - Augusto Pinochet Ugarte - the British
courts held that crimes such as torture can never be committed
as official acts.68 Under this line of reasoning, if acts of sexual
violence committed by AMISOM troops were not perpetrated in
the official capacity of the troops, then the SOMA may not apply
and the troops may not be immune from legal process.
I
In a conflict-ridden area like Somalia, it is likely that inter-
national humanitarian law also applies. The sexual violence
committed in Somalia gives rise to criminal responsibility for
ordinary crimes, punishable according to the rules of national
jurisdiction in the country where they are committed. But the
nature of the armed conflict, as well as the range, gravity, and
intentions of the perpetrators, may be sufficient to implicate vio-
lations of the Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols,
particularly if violations of such norms are codified in the
domestic law of the troop-contributing countries.
In the case of Somalia, the conflict is largely internal.69
Assuming an internal armed conflict for our purposes, it may be
argued that both Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions70
and the explicit provisions of Article 4 of Additional Protocol
II of the Conventions apply. 1 Common Article 3, for its part,
prohibits "violence to life and person," "cruel treatment," or
other "outrages upon personal dignity."72 Article 4 of Additional
Protocol II protects civilians in an internal armed conflict from
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form
of indecent assault."73 Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone,
Kenya, and Ethiopia are the countries contributing troops to
AMISOM's military component74 and they are all parties to
Additional Protocol II, though Somalia is not a party.71 These
avenues for criminal responsibility, as well as those arising
under international criminal law, should be fully explored in
determining the scope of responsibility for peacekeeping forces
implicated in serious sexual violence.
C0 I
Somalia, though emerging from its reputation as a failed
state, must now assure that its own citizens' most basic human
rights are protected. Situations in which there are few strictures
on misconduct, immense discretion in operational scope, and
the cloak of international immunities should never serve as a
shield against either violations of fundamental human rights
or grave violations of the laws of war. International partners
in post-conflict institution building can play an important sup-
portive role, but should never be a part of the problem. As the
forgoing analysis demonstrates, there are myriad problems with
legal responsibility in this context for individuals, states, or
international institutions involved in criminal activity. Creative
advocacy may provide innovative solutions while assuring that
victims of sexual violence are protected from retaliation if they
come forward to seek justice.
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